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ABSTRACT
We review the arguments in the finance and open macroeconomics literature relevant for the Central Bank to
set the level of the interest rate in an open economy. The two relevant risks are the currency and country risks.
The country risk (Brazil Risk) is measured with different financials instruments and the (unobservable)
currency risk is estimated via the Kalman Filter. We show that—besides the currency risk, which is also
relevant in developed economies—the country risk is of utmost importance to determine the domestic interest
rates. Both risks share a few common causes, which is why we call them the cousin risks. Thus, when and if
those common causes are confronted, the fall of domestic interest rates may be substantial, because both
currency and Brazil risks will fall simultaneously. Preliminary results identify some components of the Brazil
risk, e.g., the fiscal deficits, and the domestic and international financial markets conditions. The
convertibility risk, defined as risk associated with possibility of not being able to convert BRLs into foreign
currency, showed up as an important cause of the Brazil risk during the international financial crises periods,
but is no longer relevant. Nowadays, Brazil risk decreased significantly, but the same did not happen with the
currency risk. Therefore, it seems that the main factor precluding the fall in domestic interest rates may be
associated with the uncertainty of the future behavior of the balance payments, especially the trade account. In
view of this hypothesis, we might speculate that assuring vigorous export growth, without resorting to
devaluation, is fundamental to achieve lower real interest rates, compatible with sustained economic growth.
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Executive Summary
We review the arguments in the finance and open macroeconomics literature that are
relevant for the Central Bank to set the level of the interest rate in an open economy. The
country risk (Brazil Risk) is measured with different financial instruments, and the currency
risk is estimated via the Kalman Filter. We show that—besides the currency risk, which is
also relevant in developed economies—the country risk is very important in determining
domestic interest rates. Both risks have a few causes in common, which explain us calling
them the cousin risks. Thus, when and if those common causes are confronted, the fall of
domestic interest rates can be substantial, because both currency and Brazil risks may fall at
the same time.
Preliminary results identify the components of the Brazil risk, e.g., the fiscal deficits, and
the domestic and international financial markets conditions. The convertibility risk, defined
as risk associated with possibility of not being able to convert BRLs into foreign currency,
showed up as an important cause of the Brazil risk during the international financial crises
periods, but has become of negligible importance in the new floating exchange rate regime.
Nowadays, the Brazil risk has also decreased significantly, but the same did not happen
with the currency risk. One possibility is that the main factor precluding a larger fall in
domestic interest rates may be associated with the uncertainty of the future behavior of the
balance payments, especially the trade account. As a corollary of this hypothesis, we might
speculate that assuring vigorous export growth, without resorting to devaluation, is
fundamental to achieve lower real interest rates, compatible with sustained economic
growth.4
I. INTRODUCTION
The interest rate constitutes one of the most important macroeconomic variables
responsible for the economy’s good performance. It is essential to have a well-calibrated
interest rate, because interest rates play an important role in the determination of several
economic variables, e.g., output and employment levels, the exchange rate, and others.
Not surprisingly, it is almost impossible to obtain a consensus about the ideal interest rate
level. The fact that Alan Greenspan has a high degree of respectability nowadays is a recent
fact in USA. In the beginning of the Volker era, less than 20 years ago, the unemployment
associated with the deflationary effort led people to print “Wanted” posters with him and
the Fed board of directors! Nowadays, in Brazil, it is not unusual to read in the newspaper
complaints about the high level of interest rates.
Figure 1 shows the monthly evolution of Brazilian real interest rates in the last 25 years.
The thin (black) line represents the monthly real interest rate (expressed in % p.y.) and the
thick (red) line is the respective 12-month moving average (also expressed in % p.y.). The
horizontal lines show the real interest rate averages in three periods: the second half of the
seventies, the eighties plus a few months, and the opening up of domestic financial markets
to international investors (since May 1991). The huge jump in interest rates during the
recent financial liberalization period is clear.
1
The last decade was marked by inflation stabilization that came with the Real Plan in July
1994, and for the trade and financial openness of the Brazilian economy. We adopted May
1991 as the reference date of the financial liberalization, because it coincides with the
edition of the famous Annex IV that opened the Brazilian economy to the possibility of
external portfolio investments.
                                                          
1  We use here the Selic rate (the analogue of the FED funds rate) deflated by the centered General Price
Index (IGP-DI). Therefore, we refer to the very high real interest rates that enter the liability side of the
government and of financial institutions. Active interest rates are even higher, given the very high bank
spread in Brazil, a phenomenon that is pervasive in Latin America (see Brock and Rojas-Suárez [2000]). We,











































































































































































When an economy liberalizes its capital account, it loses one degree of freedom to fix its
own interest rate. This is due to capital flows. Under a fixed exchange rate regime (or a
controlled one), a low interest rate could bring about capital outflows, which cause
monetary contraction and a consequent rise in interest rates. Under a flexible exchange rate
regime, a low interest rate would cause an incipient capital flight that would depreciate the
exchange rate. Between these two polar regimes, there are several of others possibilities,
such as a crawling peg cum controls over the capital flows. Since the financial liberalization
in the beginning of the 90’s, Brazil has adopted several different forms of exchange rate
regime and controls on capital inflows.
We aim at studying the determinants of interest rates in Brazil since it became a financially
open economy. Based on the interest parity conditions, we study the behavior of the cousin
risks: the currency risk and the country risk. These two risks are fundamental in the
determination of a floor to the domestic interest rate, and reducing them is the main
objective if one aim at achieving interest rates compatible with sustained economic growth.6
II. COUNTRY RISK AND CURRENCY RISK: WHAT ARE THEY?
II.1. The Country Risk
At present, the developed countries are considered financially integrated. The financial
integration, however, was achieved only in the last decades (see, for example, Frankel
[1991]). Even the developed economies had severe restrictions on international capital
flows in the beginning of the 70s.
For many emerging markets, these restrictions to the international capital flows just began
to be withdrawn in the beginning of the 90s, together with the implementation of the Brady
Plan. However, despite the increasing financial integration, it cannot be said that there is
perfect capital mobility among these countries, as we are going to see next.
Among the several possible measures of perfect capital mobility Frankel [1991] concludes
that the most appropriate is the covered parity of interest rates, in which ...capital flows
equalize interest rates among countries when denominated in the same currency. The
covered interest parity differential (CID) is usually known as country risk, because it affects
the yields of all financial assets in a certain country.  The developed countries do not have
CID, i.e., the CID among them is negligible. This means that if a large multinational
enterprise wants to make a loan in USD, the interest rate would be the same whether the
commercial paper is issued in England or in the US. However, had the bond been floated in
an emerging market (without a foreign collateral), the interest rate (in USD) would have
been higher. This difference is one possible measure of the country risk.
Because it contaminates all financial assets in a certain country, the country risk cannot be
hedged within that country, i.e., it will not be eliminated with investment diversification
among the assets in that country. Being a systemic risk, the country risk increases the yield
required for all the assets in the country, or, equivalently, it reduces the price of the assets if
compared to the identical ones issued in the developed countries.
2
                                                          
2  We acknowledge the fact that the country risk is usually considered a diversifiable risk from the point of7
The differential (or deviation) of the covered interest rates parity
3 is the best measure of the
lack of perfect capital mobility ...because it captures all barriers to integration of financial
markets across national boundaries: transactions costs, information costs, capital controls,
tax laws that discriminate by country of residence, default risk, and risk of future capital
controls [Frankel, 1991].
Thus, the country risk is a portrait of the economic and financial situation of a certain
country, also showing the political stability and the historic performance in fulfilling its
financial obligations.
II. 2. The Currency Risk
The risk aversion that usually characterizes the behavior of investors in financial markets
may drive the price of some financial assets away from the relevant expectations. Risk
averse investors do not enter in fair gambles (gambles with zero expected value). They
require some compensation, which generates a positive expected value for most
investments.
Investors in emerging markets currency futures markets require something more than the
emerging currency expected currency depreciation to sell their hard currency in the future.
There is a currency risk that creates a wedge between the expected price of the hard
currency (typically the USD) in the future and the price of that currency in the currency
futures or forward market.
Unfortunately, in contrast with what occurs with the country risk, the currency risk is not
measurable directly through the existing assets’ yields. This impossibility of direct
measurement is due to the inability of observing the expected depreciation. Here we will
use two econometric techniques to uncover the currency risk.
                                                                                                                                                                                
view of foreign investors. However, the empirical evidence that we will show demonstrates very clearly that
the country risk is priced. It is possible that this apparent puzzle be related to another one, the enormous
homes bias prevalent in many economies (see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff [1996], p. 305).
3  We are going to define formally in next sections covered interest parity.8
 II. 3. The Measurement Methods of the Cousin Risks
We will use several securities, especially derivatives, to measure the country and currency
risks. Through the USD futures market, at BM&F,
4 it is possible to measure the country
risk through the arbitrage concept. The USD futures contracts
5 are contracts between two
market players, in which the player with the long position commits to buy from the player
with the short position a predetermined amount of USD at a given date in the future paying
the agreed delivery price (in BRLs). Conversely, the institution with the short position
commits to sell at that future date for that predetermined delivery price the amount of USD
previously agreed.
6 Thus, on the futures contract settlement date, if the spot USD costs
more than the futures price, the player with the long position wins  (because he or she
bought the same USD for a lower price than the market price), and the player with the short
position loses.
Under perfect capital mobility, the USD futures market allows for arbitrage transactions
between the domestic and international interest rates. Through that arbitrage transaction, we
are going to extract one of measures of the Brazil Risk.
In the Finance theory, an arbitrage opportunity is a financial transaction in which it is
possible to obtain some positive gain without any risk from a zero initial
capital/investment. In practice, the arbitrage concept is used to describe low risk
transactions, like buy (cheaply) in a market and resell (more expensively) in another
market. Thus, the description of that arbitrage transaction requires an analysis of two cases,
the first one is when the USD futures contract is expensive, and the second one is when the
USD futures contract is cheap. As we will see, we are more interested in the second case,
which will originate a positive Brazil Risk.
                                                          
4  BM&F is the Commodities and Futures Exchange in São Paulo, Brazil. It is the main exchange where
derivative securities are traded in Brazil.
5 This Subsection draws heavily from Garcia [1997].
6 This description is not complete, since we are omitting important operational details like the collaterals
required by BM&F, and daily margin settlements. Introducing them in the analysis, however, makes the
analysis much more complicated without adding further insights.9
1
st case) The USD futures contract is expensive [f  > s (1+i)/(1+i*)]
1.a) Buy US$ 1 in the spot exchange rate market, paying R$ s (s is the USD spot
price);
1.b) To pay for that purchase of US$1, a loan of R$ s is needed in the domestic
market, accruing interest at rate i, i.e., in the expiry date of the loan, R$ s (1+i) will
be paid back;
1.c) Invest the US$ 1 bought in the international market, receiving interest of i*, i.e.,
in the expiry date of the investment, US$ (1+i*) will be received;
1.d) Sell in the USD futures market at the prevailing price f the amount that is going
to be received for the international investment, US$ (1+i*), i.e., R$ f (1+i*) is going
to be received for the sale of USD in the futures market at the settlement date of the
futures contract, which coincides with the loan expiry date;
The transactions (1.a) to (1.d) give a profit of R$ [f (1+i*) – s (1+i)] at the settlement date
of the USD futures contract without the need of any initial capital. Note that there is no risk
at all in this whole transaction, because all the prices are known at present time. If the profit
is positive, it is said that there is an arbitrage opportunity. If it occurs, it is possible to make
a profit following the steps (1.a) to (1.d) without incurring in any risk at all and without any
initial capital.
We now analyze the second case of arbitrage, which is symmetric to the first one, thereby
occurring when the USD futures contract is cheap.
2
nd case) The USD futures contract is cheap [f  < s (1+i)/(1+i*)]
2.a) Sell US$ 1 in today’s market, receiving R$ s (s is the price of USD spot);10
2.b) To obtain the US$1 sold in item (2.a), a loan of US$1 is necessary in the
international market, paying for that the interest of i*, i.e., at the expiry date of the
loan, US$ (1+i*) will be paid back;
2.c) R$ s obtained in item (2.a) should be invested in the domestic market, accruing
the interest rate i, i.e., in the expiry date of the investment, R$ s (1+i) will be
received;
2.d) US$ (1+i*) will be bought in the USD futures market at the prevailing price f ,
i.e., the amount that is known that will be paid to the international creditor should
be bought and the final price for that purchase is R$ f (1+i*).
Transactions (2.a) to (2.d) result in a profit of R$ [s (1+i) – f (1+i*)] at the settlement date
of the USD futures contract, without the need of any initial capital. As this is a riskless
transaction, because all prices are known at the present time, if the profit is positive, is said
that there is an arbitrage opportunity. If that occurs, it is possible to have a profit following
the steps (2.a) to (2.d) without incurring in any risk at all and without any initial capital. It
should be noted that cases 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive.
In practice, financial markets are aware of those arbitrage opportunities, thus we can expect
that none of the cases above will last for long. Therefore, the very existence of arbitrageurs
in financial markets means that there will be a lack of arbitrage opportunities like the two
cases described above. The only case in which neither arbitrage opportunity occurs is when:
R$ [f (1+i*) – s (1+i)] = R$ [s (1+i) – f (1+i*)] = R$ 0, i.e.,
( )
( )









However, in practice, the USD futures price almost always lies below the value of f in
equation 1, as it is seen in Figure 2. It portrays the typical behavior of a USD futures11
contract. The thicker (black) line in the bottom is the exchange rate (USD/BRL), from
6/1/1998 to 11/3/1998 (right-hand-side scale). The solid (red) line in the middle is the
futures price for the November futures contract (maturing on the first business day of
November, 1998). The upper dotted (blue) line is the theoretical limit established by
covered interest parity, i.e., what the futures price would have been had covered interest
parity been held. The wedge between the actual futures price and the theoretical one is the
CID, which is represented by the bars in % per year (left-hand-side scale).
7 That wedge is
the country risk.
When the USD future rate lies below limit f , established in equation 1, there is an arbitrage
opportunity like the one described in the 2
nd case of the last section (when the USD futures
contract is cheap). In such environment, foreign investors may resort to a loan in the US,
transfer the funds to Brazil and invest them at a fixed interest rate. Simultaneously, the
foreign investor hedges himself against currency devaluation in the USD futures market
and he can still have a net gain after the repayment of the loan in the USA. In theory, it is
possible for the foreign investor to have a positive profit with a zero initial investment
without assuming any risk at all, i.e., there would be an arbitrage profit. Indeed, that has
been the source of immense profits for many players in the Brazilian financial market in the
nineties until the start of the international financial crises.
                                                          
7 One should not be very impressed by the increase in the CID a few days before the contract settlement date,
Figure 2





















































































































































































































































































































When that arbitrage profit is zero, then the covered interest parity condition holds. Covered
interest parity is equivalent to the equation (1) above. However, Figure 2 shows that, in
Brazil, that condition was usually violated. There was a covered interest parity differential,
described before as a good measure for the country risk. In the next section, we are going to
use the covered interest parity condition to analyze the domestic interest rate.
II. 4. Analysis of the Domestic Interest Rate
8
For emerging markets like Brazil, the domestic interest rate can be analyzed in the
following way, according to the definition of covered interest parity adding the country
risk:
9
(2)            cor s) (f i   =   i + - + *
Following the same notation used before, i is the domestic interest rate; i*, international
interest rate; f, (in logs) the USD futures price; s, (in logs) the USD spot price and cor, the
country risk.
The second term of the equation above is called the forward premium, and it is observable
through futures market.
10 The forward premium can be analyzed in the following way:
( ) ( ) f s E s s cur t T t - = - +          (3)
                                                                                                                                                                                
because, as maturity approaches, the contract loses liquidity and the price is no longer very informative.
8 This subsection is strongly based in Garcia and Olivares [2000]. Here, the meaning of the word analysis is
breakdown.
9 From this section on, we start using continuous compounding. We do this to ensure, in the following interest
rates decomposition exercises, that the parts are add up to the total. As it is well known, only in continuous
compounding and simple compounding, equivalent rates are proportional (i.e., 1% per month corresponds to
12% per year, for example).
10 As we will explain later (Subsection IV.2), the measure of the forward premium also depends on where the
contract is traded.13
The first term on the right side of the equation above,  ( ) t T s s - t E   , is the expected
depreciation measured today, i.e., the difference between the (log of) spot USD today, t,
and the value of the (log of) spot USD at the end of the period, T. The second term, cur, is
the currency risk premium, i.e., the difference between the USD futures price and the
expectation of the spot USD at the settlement date, being the first term usually higher than
the second one. As we shall see, at times of uncertainty, this difference increases,
decreasing in less turbulent periods.
The problem faced is that currency risk is not measurable in a direct way, because there are
no direct measures of expectations. What is registered is the USD futures price, but USD
futures are distinct (usually higher) than the expectations of the USD spot in the future.
Therefore, for countries with floating exchange rate regimes, it is interesting to decompose
the domestic interest rate according to the following equation:
i i E s s cor cur t T t = + - + +
* ( )           (4)
Based on equation (2), it is possible to obtain the country risk by residual:
cor = i – i* - (f-s)
It is also possible to obtain another measure for the country risk, again by residual, through
the yield (usually referred as coupon in the Brazilian market) of USD-linked bonds, which
is the rate of return, in foreign currency, of a domestic investment (in Brazil) in a USD
indexed bond.
11 It is possible to analyze the yield of this coupon on USD-linked bonds (cc):
                                                          
11 This rate is traded in BM&F, both through a futures contract (DDI) and a swap contract (Dol x Pre), for
different maturities (the swap is longer). The reader should consult the description of BM&F contracts at
www.bmf.com.br. For the validity of equation (5), it is necessary that the rate traded in BM&F be converted
to continuous compounding.14
cc i cor = +
*           (5).
In the following section, we are going to use financial instruments, including derivatives,
available in domestic and international financial markets, to measure the components of the
right side of equation (4), and proceed to the analysis of domestic interest rates.
III. MEASUREMENT OF CURRENCY RISK AND COUNTRY RISK
In this section, we generate the measures for the country risk and the estimates for the
currency risk. Those measures will be used in the analysis of domestic interest rates in the
next section.
III. 1. Brazil Risk
We developed several measures of Brazil Risk, computed in different ways for the period
January, 1995 to August, 2000.
12 These different measures come from several securities,
including derivatives. The country risk measures will vary according to the securities used
in its computation. We will now describe the different financial instruments used in the
analysis.
III. 1. 1. Swaps
The first approach for the covered interest parity differential for the Brazilian case was
made using data from the Brazilian fixed income markets, which capture all the variables
involved in this analysis. The following two swap contracts were used: DI X Dol, which is
a currency swap, and DI X Pre, which is an interest rate swap. Swaps may be interpreted as
a collection of forward agreements. Each of the swaps used here are akin to only one
forward agreement, since they involve only one settlement.  And since forward contracts
are quite similar to futures contracts, our approach will be based in the arbitrage conditions
developed in Subsection II.3 for the futures contracts.
                                                          
12 For data on the early nineties, see Garcia and Valpassos [2000].15
 The raw data used in this analysis are one-year contracts, thereby capturing one-year-ahead
expectations. Thus, they should reflect one-year expectations for currency depreciation,
domestic and international interest rate.
13 We also conducted the same analysis with the
other (shorter) time spans available, but opted for the one-year-ahead period (the longest
available) because it is less volatile.
14
The result are displayed in Figure 3. The different areas show the behavior of each of the
components analyzed (left-hand-side scale) and the line represents the Brazil Risk (right-
hand-side scale).
15 The sum of all areas is the one-year-ahead domestic interest rate,
measured by the Swaps DI X Pre contracts (right-hand-side scale).
III. 1. 2. Bonds Issued Abroad (Foreign Debt)
Another way to measure the Brazil Risk is through the Brazilian foreign debt, the majority
of which is denominated in USD. Therefore, the measure of Brazil Risk is the difference
between the secondary market yield of these bonds and the yield of a risk free bond,
                                                          
13 A detailed description of the data set is in Appendix 1.
14 See Appendix 2 for a comparison between Brazil Risk in the short and medium run.
Figure 3

















































































































































































































































International Interest Rate Implied Depreciation Brazil Risk (RHS scale) Brazil Risk (LHS scale)16
typically a US Treasury Bond with the same expiry date of swap contracts, i.e. the spread-
over-treasury of the bond.
C-Bond and IDU are the Brazilian Bonds considered in this analysis. The IDUs (Interest
Due and Unpaid) are sovereign bonds issued in November 20, 1992 (US$ 7,100 millions)
with expiry date in January 1, 2001, under the terms of the Brady agreement. C-Bonds
(Brazil Capitalization Bond (C)) are sovereign bonds, which were issued in April 15, 1994
(US$ 7,387 millions) and have a longer life, with expiry date in April 15, 2014. Therefore,
the difference in yields between these two bonds reflect, among other effects, the slope of
the yield curve. In the beginning of the period analyzed here, IDU bonds were the most
traded Brazilian bonds in foreign markets. However, they started to lose liquidity in the
market as they approached maturity, and in the last few years, the C-Bond became the most
liquid Brady Bond. Figure 4 shows all the measures of Brazil Risk together, allowing a
comparative analysis.
As it can be seen from Figure 4, the measures of Brazil risk move together. After the
Mexican crisis (December 1994), all of them were decreasing until the Asian crisis in
October 1997. After that event, all of them started a decreasing trend, although at a level
                                                                                                                                                                                
15 The upper area is the same as the line, only in different scales.
 Figure 4

















































































































































Brazil Risk: Domestic Interest Rate Brazil Risk: C-Bond Brazil Risk: IDU17
higher than before the Asian crisis, until the start of the Russian crisis and the collapse of
Hedge Fund Long Term Capital Management in August 1998. The Brazil Risk increased
substantially during that period (by all measures) and, again, it decreased after the crisis.
However, it remained at an even higher level than before the Russian crisis, which was
already higher than before the Asian crisis. The downward trend ended with Brazilian
devaluation in January 1999. When it happened, all the three measures exploded and started
a soft decline only in the second quarter of 1999. In summary, all these measures show a
very high correlation, strongly reacting to the local and international crises. Table 1 shows
the estimated first statistical moments of the different measures of the Brazil risk.
TABLE 1
STATISTICS OF BRAZIL RISK´S DIFFERENT MEASURES
CORRELATION
RB - CBond RB - IDU IDU - Cbond








































CRISES(CONTROLLED EXCHANGE  RATE )
(UNTIL DEC/ 1998)
0.01562 0.02574 0.0450718
Although they are extremely positively correlated, the differences among the different
measures are not negligible. Some of the reasons for these differences are the existence of
different kind of risks inherent to any of the financial instruments used in the analysis,
different tax treatment among them, and the fact that these instruments have different
maturities and durations (they are at different points of the yield curve).
Another important reason to explain the difference between the Brazil Risk measure
derived from the domestic interest rate and the others derived from the secondary market
yields of the foreign debt (Stripped Spread C-Bond and IDU/Libor) is the fact that domestic
interest rates in the short run are somewhat under the Central Bank’s control. The others
just reflect just expectations of agents expressed by the secondary market yield of these
bonds. For example, the Central Bank might fix the domestic interest rate at a higher level
than what the risk perception of foreign investors would require to maintain their funds in
domestic bonds. In this case, which actually occurred from mid-1995 until the Asian crisis,
and again during the first four months of 1998, there were huge capital inflows, causing
large accumulations of foreign reserves (which seemed to be one of the Central Bank’s
policy objectives during those periods).
Therefore, the Brazil Risk measured through domestic interest rates (Swaps) measures how
much yield the domestic fixed return assets offers to cover the Brazil Risk. The Brazil Risk
measured through the yields of external debt bonds (Stripped Spread C-Bond and
IDU/Libor) measures the yield required by investors to cover the Brazil Risk. When the
former measure was bigger than the latter one, there was a capital inflow. And, in the same
way, when the former was smaller, there was a capital outflow.
This situation, however, seems to have changed recently. As shown in Figure 4, the Swaps
line has been systematically below the Stripped Spread C-Bond line without causing further
depreciation.
16 Probably, this new dynamics is associated with more inflow of direct
investments in Brazil, which are much less sensitive to the interest rates than the short run
                                                          
16 For the recent period, IDU has become less relevant because it lost liquidity due to its short maturity.19
capital that has entered (and left) until the BRL’s devaluation of January, 1999. Now, we
turn to the currency risk estimation.
III.2. Currency Risk
As noted before, the currency risk cannot be measured directly through financial
instruments: currency risk is non-observable. In a classic paper, Eugene Fama [1984]
derived and tested a model for the joint measurement of the currency risk premium
variation and the expected depreciation variation of forward rates. He used data from nine
of the most internationally traded currencies in the period of August 1973 – December
1982, and he found evidence that both components of forward rates vary with time. The
two main conclusions of Fama’s paper are the following:
1. The currency risk premium and the forward market’s expected depreciation rates are
negatively correlated, and
2. Movements in the forward rates are mostly due to risk premium variations.
Garcia and Olivares [2000] check the validity of these “fundamentals” conclusions of Fama
for Brazil, using data of the USD futures market of BM&F from April 1995 –December
1998, a period in which was adopted a controlled exchange rate regime. The first of Fama’s
conclusions – the expected depreciation covaries negatively with the risk premium – was
refuted, with the estimates indicating a positive correlation between them. The second of
Fama’s conclusions – the largest part of futures price variations is due to risk premium
variations – was corroborated by the point estimates, although it has not been possible to
reject the hypothesis that the variance of risk premium was equal to the variance of
expected depreciation rate. Therefore, Fama’s [1984] framework corroborated the
importance of the currency risk in the determination of USD futures price in Brazil, and
consequently, as a component of domestic interest rates.
The same analysis was undertaken with another data set. This alternative data set contains
daily data for one-month-ahead currency swap contracts traded in BM&F (akin to one-
month-ahead forward contracts). The available data cover December 10, 1997 to November
19, 1999. The results obtained show that, before the floating of the BRL in January 1999,20
the estimates of the slope coefficient of Fama’s regression were not usually negative,
however they were close to zero. When the turbulent period of January and February of
1999 were included in the regression, that slope coefficient drastically increased, and after
that period, they decreased and oscillated around the (positive) value of one. This change in
level can be explained by change of exchange rate regime. Brazil abandoned the crawling-
peg regime--where the variance of risk premium was at least as much, if not even more
important than the variance of the expected devaluation rate--for the floating exchange rate,
in which the variance of the expected depreciation became higher than the variance of risk
premium.
Garcia and Olivares [2000] go beyond the indirect measurement of the expected
depreciation and currency risk premium shares allowed for by Fama’s framework, and use
an econometric technique aimed at estimating a non-observable variable – the Kalman
Filter – to estimate the currency risk and the expected depreciation (these two add up to the
forward premium).
The resulting estimates for the currency risk and for the expected depreciation obtained by
Garcia and Olivares [2000] are shown in Figure 5 below. After estimating the currency risk,
the expected depreciation is obtained by subtracting the currency risk from the forward
premium. Figure 5 shows the analysis of forward premium. This analysis is very useful to















































































































































































Expected Depreciation Currency Risk21
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC INTEREST RATE
IV.1.  Breakdown of the Domestic Interest Rate
From the results obtained by Garcia and Olivares [2000], it is possible to analyze the
domestic interest rate. Based on what was seen (see equation (4)), the domestic interest rate
can be decomposed as the sum of the following components:
17
• International interest rate;
• Currency expected depreciation;
• Currency risk;
• Country risk.
Figure 6 shows this analysis. To understand the joint behavior of those components, it is
interesting to study the correlation between our estimates of currency risk, expected
devaluation rate and the covered interest parity differential (the Brazil risk). Table 2 shows
the correlation between the variables. Observe that there is a positive correlation between
the currency risk premium and expected depreciation rate, which is consistent with the
results of Garcia and Olivares [2000] using the Fama methodology.
18 On the other side, the
covered interest parity differential (the Brazil risk) shows a much higher correlation with
the currency risk premium than with expected devaluation, the latter being almost null. This
indicates that some of the factors that explain the currency risk could be the same as some
of the factors that explain the Brazil risk. This is why we call those two risks the cousin
risks.
                                                          
17 It should be remembered that the adoption of continuous compounding allows us to express the domestic
interest rate as sum of its components.
18 Remember that the so called forward premium puzzle (negative slope coefficient in Fama’s regression) is
implied by the existence of a negative correlation between the risk premium and the expected depreciation
rate, but Garcia and Olivares [2000] have not found a negative coefficient to Brazil.22
Figure 6











































































































































































Expected Depreciation International Interest Rate Currency Risk Brazil Risk
TABLE 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN ESTIMATES
Period 1995:04 - 1998:12
Exp. Dev. Currency Risk Brazil Risk
Exp. Dev. 1,000 0,505 0,066
Currency Risk 1,000 0,499
Brazil Risk 1,000
In summary, when using the estimate for the currency risk premium obtained via the
Kalman filter, it was possible to estimate the expected devaluation rate. Garcia and Olivares
[2000] calculated, thus, the covered interest parity differential, or Brazil Risk. The interest
rate decomposition exercise showed not only that the covered interest parity cannot be
verified in the Brazilian case, but also that covered interest parity differential constitutes a
sizeable component of the domestic interest rate. There is a positive correlation between the
currency risk and the expected depreciation rate. The Brazil risk shows a high correlation
with the currency risk and is almost orthogonal to the expected depreciation, which is an
indication that both risks are mostly explained by common macroeconomic factors. In the23
next section, some preliminary attempts are made at identifying some macroeconomic
factors that lie behind the cousin risks.
19
IV.2. The Determinants of the Cousin Risks
In this section, a preliminary analysis will be undertaken to identify some of the
determinants of Brazil Risk and currency risk. It could be argued that the currency risk
premium is due to the fact that it is a systemic risk associated to the inability to diversify
relatively to the exchange rate. This risk is associated, as is Brazil Risk, to the domestic
macroeconomic fundamentals and to the external shocks.
An interesting political economy question is which factors among the macroeconomic
fundamentals that affect both the currency and the Brazil risks are more important, because
it is exactly these that should be confronted to allow a more effective fall in interest rates.
For example, if Brazil Risk and currency risk are both determined by fragile fiscal
fundamentals, an improvement in these conditions would bring about a substantial fall in
interest rates. But, if these risks are mainly determined by doubts about balance of
payments sustainability, it will not be an improvement in fiscal situation that would bring a
significant decrease in interest rates. We now turn to the study of these determinants.
One of the main determinants of a country’s (say, Brazil) Risk is the convertibility risk, i.e.,
the risk associated with the possibility of not being able to convert BRLs into foreign
currency. This risk encompasses the possibility that capital controls may be introduced
preventing the international transfer of funds, but do not include the default risk (which is
included in the country risk).
To obtain one measure of this convertibility risk, a data set of implied currency
depreciation in BRLs’ non-deliverable forwards contracts (NDF) traded in New York was
used, subtracting the expected depreciation measured by swap contracts from the NDFs, as
                                                          
19 The objective is to investigate the determinants of both the Brazil Risk and the currency risk. However, we
still do not have any reliable estimate of currency risk for the period after the BRL devaluation, restricting
Subsection IV.2.24
was done to calculate one of the measures of Brazil Risk. So, the difference between these
expected depreciations is a proxy for the convertibility risk.
20
In other words, a NDF contract is essentially the same as the currency swap (or futures)
contract traded in BM&F in São Paulo, except for the fact that the contract traded in NY is
settled in USD and the contract traded in São Paulo is settled in BRL. For example, an
investor that had bet on the BRL devaluation before January 1999 would have made a lot of
money, but his gain would have been paid in USD in NY and in BRL in Brazil. Under free
convertibility, both gains would be the same, because it would be possible to obtain USD
with the equivalent sum of BRLs. However, if any controls on the remittance of USD to the
foreign country after the devaluation were imposed, the two amounts would not be the
same. The investor that traded in São Paulo would receive BRLs (nominally) equivalent to
the USD, but he would not be able to receive the equivalent amount in USD. In the past,
when this kind of situation happened, the so called black market of USD traded at a huge
premium. It is because of this convertibility risk that the price of USD in the NDFs
(measured by the inverse of the price of BRL-NDF) is higher than the USD futures traded
in the BM&F in São Paulo. The difference between prices is transformed into annual
yields, with the results shown in Figure 7A.
                                                          
20 All data are daily and relative to the one-year period covering from December 1995 to June 2000.25
In this Figure, it is possible to observe that a learning process concerning the pricing of the
convertibility risk occurred. Until the Asian crisis, the convertibility risk was around zero,
i.e., the markets were not pricing the convertibility risk. Therefore, during this period until
the first crisis, the Asian crisis, the convenience yield—the yield that reflects the
differences between the prices of contracts traded in NY and São Paulo—did not reflect the
convertibility risk.
When the Asian crisis erupted in October 1997, the market suddenly learned that those two
contracts were not equal, i.e., the contracts traded in SP had a higher risk than the NDFs
traded in NY, namely, the convertibility risk. At that time, there were stories flying about
arbitrageurs that sold USD futures in NY and bought them in SP, thinking that they were
completely hedged in their investments. When the Asian crisis happened, and they found
out that they were carrying risks and not arbitraging, they rushed to close out their
positions, selling in SP and buying in NY, which might have originated the sudden jump in
the convertibility risk that is seen in Figure 7A.
21
Since the convertibility risk is one of the components of the country (Brazil) risk, it is
interesting to compare the behavior of the two risks. In Figure 7B, the Brazil risk is
measured by the Brazil Risk (IDU) measure, whose duration is shorter than that of the C-
                                                          
21  Brazilian tax laws could potentially have played a role, as well as fears that the possible bankruptcy of
Figure 7A




















































































































































Bond. In Figure 7C, the Brazil risk is measured by the stripped spread of the C-Bond
(Brazil Risk: C-Bond) and the Brazil Risk: Domestic Interest Rate.
Note that after the Asian crisis, the convertibility risk became closer to the country risk, but
now at a positive level, in contrast with the earlier period. Thus, after the Asian crisis,
convertibility risk and country risk started to move together.
During the Russian crisis (August 1998) and the fall of LTCM, the convertibility risk
jumped again, rising to extremely high levels in comparison to the preceding periods. Then,
it became of similar magnitude of the country risk, and in the subsequent very turbulent
periods, it became even higher than the latter.
Thus, after the Asian crisis, markets learned to price convertibility risk. It then became an
important component of the country (Brazil) risk, and both risks started to exhibit similar
behavior. The worse the crisis, the more important the convertibility risk became in
explaining country risk. When the economic environment improved after the devaluation,
the convertibility risk started a soft fall, although it has not returned to negligible levels
previous to the Asian crisis, remaining at a positive, although lower, level.
                                                                                                                                                                                
many institutions could threaten the clearinghouse solvency.
Figure 7B





































































































































































Now, we are going to analyze another determinant of Brazil Risk, the situation of the
external fixed return market. Different kinds of financial instruments have different kinds
of credit risk, with US Treasury Bonds having zero credit risk. The “appetite” of
international markets for credit risk (inversely related to the degree of risk aversion for
credit risk) varies over time. For example, the collapse of the Hedge Fund Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) started a process of flight to quality, in which the investors,
suddenly, became more risk averse, and tried to sell all their riskier assets to invest the
funds in safe US Treasury Bonds. This movement affected Brazilian bonds in a negative
way, despite the remarkable improvements in domestic fundamentals that followed the IMF
agreement in the last quarter of 1998.
To measure the demand side for the Brazilian bonds, or the degree of risk aversion, the US
10-Year Junk Bond Spread
22 was used. In this spread, all US Junk Bonds whose credit
rating is the same as Brazilian sovereign debt are included, i.e., bonds that have lower
ratings  - below Baa (or BBB or B2, in the case of private bonds), according to the credit
rating agencies like Standard and Poor's and Moody's.
23
                                                          
22  Data are obtained from Bloomberg.












































































































































































































Convertibility Risk in Brazil28
Therefore, the US 10-Year Junk Bond Spread measures the appetite for risk of the US fixed
rate market; the higher the spread is, the lower is the appetite for risk. Figure 8 shows the
US 10-Year Junk Bond Spread data (on the right-hand-side scale) together with the other
measures of country risk and convertibility risk (on the left-hand-side scale). Observe that
the demand for riskier bonds in USA worsened after LTCM collapsed after the Russian
crisis, improved after that, worsening again in 2000, reaching the same levels as during the
1998 crisis. This is a factor of utmost importance affecting Brazilian bonds’ prices and,
through capital flows, also domestic interest rates. Needless to say that it is impossible to
have any control over that important demand-side variable.
To improve the comparison, we calculated the correlations between the Stripped Spread of
C-Bond (C-Bond), Brazil Risk measured with Swaps (RB), Convertibility Risk (RC), Junk
Bond Spread (JBS) and implied depreciation present in swap contracts – called the forward
premium (FP). These correlations were computed for different subsamples, with the results
displayed in Table 3.
Table 3 corroborates our previous conclusion that the market did not price the convertibility
risk until the Asian Crisis, since its correlation with Brazil Risk (in both measures used)
was very small. However, as the period increases (including the period until December
1998), this correlation becomes stronger, especially when the correlation between the
Figure 8

































































































































































































































Brazil Risk: C-Bond Brazil Risk: Domestic Interest Rate Convertibility Risk Junk Bond Spread29
Convertibility Risk with Stripped Spread of C-Bond is considered. The strong correlation
between Convertibility and Brazil Risk is maintained (and it becomes even higher with RB)
in the period when the Brazilian economy was under a floating exchange rate regime, after
the crisis period (since June 1999). In the crises periods, the strong positive correlation with
Brazilian Risk is maintained. However, observing the correlation between convertibility
risk and one year expected depreciation measured by Swaps contracts traded on BM&F, it
can be seen that this increases with time. The correlation, with a maximum value of 0.57,
however, does not become stronger.
TABLE 3
C-BOND - RC RC – FP C-BOND - FP RB - JBS C-BOND - JBS RB - RC
PRE CRISES (UNTIL OUT/97) -0.1444 0.2893 -0.3487 0.7938 0.8328 0.0032
CONTROLLED EXCHANGE
RATE  (UNTIL DEZ/98)
0.7399 0.4399 0.2467 0.6409 0.8626 0.1689
FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE
(SINCE JAN/99)
0.6308 0.2612 0.7843 -0.2418 -0.1017 0.5961
FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE
(SINCE JUN/99)
0.8258 0.5739 0.8202 -0.2442 -0.0984 0.9139
CRISES(CONTROLLED
EXCHANGE  RATE )
(UNTIL DEC/ 1998)
0.8984 0.0303 0.1595 0.6633 0.8848 0.6186
Thus, two important results associated to the relevance of convertibility risk can be
observed through these comparisons. The first one is related to the learning process that has
occurred with Non-Deliverable BRL Forward contracts traded in NY. The second result is
related to changes in the composition of Brazil Risk in crises periods, during which the
convertibility risk becomes the most important component.
Another important and interesting result is the increase in the correlation between the
forward premium and Brazil Risk measured through C-Bonds after the adoption of a
floating exchange rate. One possible conjecture is that, with a floating exchange rate
regime, the increase in country risk affects not only currency risk, as occurred in the
controlled exchange rate period, but also the expected currency depreciation, resulting in a
higher correlation with the forward premium (which is the sum of expected depreciation
and currency risk).30
However, it is clear that these are not the only determinants of currency and Brazil risks.
Truly, these are only two of the determinants of them. Variables that reflect the expected
future behavior of fiscal and balance of payments accounts, as well as variables that reflect





Date: 02/05/01   Time: 09:41
Sample(adjusted): 2 65
Included observations: 64 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.391317 0.824927 -0.474366 0.6371
IBOVESPA_VC(-1) -0.033911 0.015106 -2.244890 0.0287
NFSP_EXP_1YRP(-1) -0.361220 0.128198 -2.817667 0.0066
TB_EXP_1YR(-1) -0.042559 0.113450 -0.375135 0.7090
JBS_10YR(-1) 0.224145 0.146930 1.525521 0.1327
CBOND_SPREAD(-1) 0.733269 0.084092 8.719842 0.0000
NASDAQ_VC(-1) -0.019529 0.011076 -1.763174 0.0832
R-squared 0.949784     Mean dependent var 8.256406
Adjusted R-squared 0.944498     S.D. dependent var 1.455535
S.E. of regression 0.342906     Akaike info criterion 0.800199
Sum squared resid 6.702331     Schwarz criterion 1.036327
Log likelihood -18.60638     F-statistic 179.6836
Durbin-Watson stat 2.052748     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 4 shows the preliminary results obtained from a regression analysis with the purpose
of explaining Brazil Risk measured by the Stripped Spread of C-Bonds. The sample period
is the floating exchange rate period, from May 1999 to August 2000, with weekly data. The
variables included in the regression are:
• one-year-ahead expected domestic fiscal conditions (NFSP_EXP_1YRP – public sector
borrowing requirements, in % of GDP);
•  one-year-ahead expected Trade Account Balance (TB_EXP_1YR, in % of GDP);
•  international financial markets conditions, measured by the a credit derivative that
provides the spread between high-yield US corporate bonds and the US Treasury bond
of equivalent duration (JBS_10YR – Junk bond spread) and the Nasdaq return; and
•  (NASDAQ_VC), domestic financial markets conditions, measured by the domestic stock
exchange return (IBOVESPA_VC).31
The one-year-ahead expected variables come from a weekly survey conducted by the
Brazilian Central Bank with Brazilian major financial institutions.
24 Using them on the
regression analysis, we try to capture the market expectations that are essential in the
perception of a country risk. All RHS variables are lagged one week to prevent
inconsistency.
The preliminary results are quite good. All variables included in the regression but
TB_EXP_1YR and JBS_10YR have the right sign and are significant. The R-squared is
quite high and the regression passed both autocorrelation and normality tests. Nevertheless,
given the small sample (64 observations), further testing is needed.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT ARE THE  DETERMINANTS OF SUCH HIGH  REAL
INTEREST RATES?
This article reviews the arguments in the finance and open macroeconomics literature that
are relevant for the Central Bank to set the level of the interest rate in an open economy.
Several of relevant concepts were shown and analyzed through several financial
instruments traded in domestic and international markets, specially, financial derivatives.
Country risk (Brazil Risk) was measured with different financial instruments and currency
risk was estimated through the Kalman Filter.
We show that—besides the currency risk, which is also relevant in developed economies—
the country risk (Brazil Risk) is important to determine the domestic interest rates. Brazil
Risk and currency risk have a strong positive correlation (0.5) for the controlled exchange
rate period of the Real Plan (the estimates for the period after the floating of the BRL are
still being carried out). This demonstrates that both risks share common causes, being,
therefore, called the cousin risks. Thus, when and if the common causes are confronted, the
fall of domestic interest rates can be substantial, because both currency and Brazil risks
may fall at the same time.
                                                          
24  These data ara available at the Central Bank website: www.bcb.gov.br.32
Although have not yet been able to provide reliable estimates for currency risk from the
floating exchange rate period, the fact is that the correlation between Brazil risk and the
forward premium (which is the sum of currency risk and expected depreciation)
significantly increased after the change of the exchange rate regime. I.e., in the current
exchange rate regime, the determinants of Brazil risk seem to affect the exchange rate (via
currency risk and via expected depreciation) and the domestic interest rates much more
strongly.
Preliminary results identify the components of Brazil Risk, e.g., the fiscal results, and the
domestic and international financial markets conditions. The convertibility risk, defined as
risk associated with possibility of not being able to convert BRLs into foreign currency,
showed up as an important cause of Brazil risk during the international financial crisis
periods, but is no longer relevant.
If one assumes that the real exchange rate will remain constant, it is possible to have and
educated guess of the currency risk size, and to compare it to the Brazil risk. Doing so will
reveal a currency risk above 5% (for one year), while the Brazil risk will hover below 3%.
The currency risk remains quite high, despite the floating regime, while the country risk has
been substantially reduced. Therefore, it seems that the principal benefits of the battle for a
fall in domestic real interest rates are in the determinants of currency risk which should be
associated to the sustainability of the balance of payments, especially the behavior of the
current account and, thus, the behavior of imports and exports. It is in that direction that
this research should continue.33
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Appendix 1 – Data Set
Domestic Interest Rate
The domestic interest rate used is the swap DI x Pre for 360 days. Swap is an exchange of
risk, without the transfer of principal, and what matters is the difference between the yields
of each side of the contract traded. It is possible to say that they are really forward
contracts. In an interest rate swap, which in this case is the swap DI x Pre, when an investor
buys one contract, he is investing his money at a floating interest rate (CDI/CETIP – DI
variation) and paying a fixed interest rate (Pre side). The quotation of those contracts is
given by the Pre rate (based on 360 days) which is used in the calculation of Brazil Risk.
International Interest Rate
The country chosen as representative of the rest of the world was the USA and as a proxy
for international interest rates that captures expectations for 1 year, 1-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate was used (published by Federal Reserve Board of Governors of the
USA). This 1-year expected interest rate, composed of the yields of traded bonds in the US
financial market, is adjusted to reflect this constant maturity of one year. The adjustment
used interpolations of daily yield curves, based on the yields (bid yields of end of the day –
closed market) of US Treasury Securities traded in the so called over-the-counter market
(for example, when a contract is dealt by phone, i.e., it is settled directly by traders and not
through a financial institution). These yields are calculated through the composition of
prices obtained by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Therefore, even if there is no
bond with this maturity, through this methodology it is possible to obtain a price for a bond
with that maturity.35
Expected Devaluation and Currency Risk Premium
To measure the expected devaluation in a certain period, the Dol X Pre currency swap rate
would be the correct one to use. However, these contracts don’t have enough liquidity to
reflect accurately economic agents’ expectations. Thus, the information in DI x Pre and DI
x Dol interest rate swap contracts
25 are analyzed together and could give us the information
in the Dol X Pre currency Swaps. Swaps contracts were explained before, and because they
are very similar to forward contracts, we can use them as a good indication of the market’s
expected devaluation. Among the most liquid contracts, there are these two just cited
above, if the period since 1999 was considered. So, this calculation is not just an abstract
way of measurement of expected devaluation in economy, it should be very close to the
true measure of it. One of the advantages of this data set could be the reduction of costs
associated to this kind of transaction through the aggregate of all these costs (transaction
costs, borrowing costs and the cost of hedging) into just two contracts.
In a DI X Dol currency swap contract, there is an exchange of two floating rates. Who takes
the long position in this contract receives the yield of DI and pays USD depreciation in the
period of the contract sum up to a known fixed interest rate (known as coupon on USD-
linked bonds). The price of that contract is given by that interest rate, being linear and
based on a 360-days basis
26.
                                                          
25 Considering as an example the data set of May 2000, the number of opened Swap DI X Pre contracts was
4.875.496, reflecting a financial traded volume of US$ 24.440.704, with 893.820 traded contracts. Of the DI
X Dol Swaps contracts, 1.304.542 contracts were opened, reflecting a traded volume of US$ 7.086.790, with
259.237 traded contracts, while only 1.127 contracts were opened for Dol X Pre swap contracts and none of
them was traded.
26 For a detailed description of these contracts, see BM&F’s site.36
Thus, the USD expected devaluation was calculated through the difference between the
quotations of DI X Pre and cleaned coupon on USD-linked bonds
27 of DI X Dol swap
contracts. However, in the expected devaluation measured through Swaps contracts there is
a risk premium inherent to these contracts. And that risk premium can give a biased
estimate of expected devaluation if compared to what really is going to occur in the period.
                                                          
27 CUMPOM CAMBIAL data were cleaned through the methodology described in Lemgruber [1999].37
Appendix 2 – Brazil Risk – Short Run X Medium Run
Figure below shows Brazil Risk as analyzed before through swap contracts and a measure
of the short run
28, 3 months, calculated in the same way as the other measure, although it
uses USD futures market traded in BM&F. Thus the differences between these two
measures of Brazil Risk reflect basic differences due to the short and medium run. An
evident fact of this comparison that can be seen in the Figure is the higher volatility of short
run measure. The volatility of the short run measure, for the period of January 1995 –
August 2000, is 6.2%, being higher than the volatility of the other measure (that reflects 1
year Brazil Risk), which is 4.1%. This reflects the fact that short run expectations are more
sensitive to daily changes in financial markets. Generally, these fluctuations are due to very
specific factors that might have affected the expectations just in that specific day, but they
are associated just to very short run expectations and are not supposed to affect the medium
and long run economic conditions. Therefore, the analysis of Brazil Risk measured with
Swaps is much more interesting and adequate in comparison to the other measure with
USD futures contracts.
                                                          
28 This Brazil Risk measure was used in Garcia and Valpassos (1999).38





























































































































































































































































































































Appendix 3 – Credit Rating Agencies
The risk of a bond issued by any government in a foreign currency is related to the fact that
this government could possibly not be able to issue money to pay its debt. Therefore, the
role of a credit rating agency is to try to analyze the ability and willingness of the
governments to generate foreign exchange enough to pay back its obligations. In this way,
the sovereign rating should be the highest in a certain country, and any other private
emission should not be able to receive a higher classification than that sovereign ceiling.
This is due to the fact that the government has the legal power to intervene through
currency controls in the capacity of all private firms to meet its obligations denominated in
foreign currency. Fitch IBCA Ratings, for example, considers in its analysis not only public
obligations, but also private ones denominated in foreign currencies to analyze the need of
a certain country to generate foreign exchanges. This is due to the fact that in 80’s there
was a renegotiation of external debts by several governments that took responsibility for the
private sector debt too.
To Moody´s and Standard and Poor's, the credit rating is an opinion about the future ability,
legal obligation and willingness of the issuer in make all the payments. Therefore, its
objective is strictly to analyze the credit conditions of the issuer and the possibilities of
default, considering the guarantees given by the issuer and the size of the possible losses for
someone who buys that credit instrument. To analyze the so-called sovereign ceiling, the
agencies consider the macroeconomic fundamentals of a certain economy, including
implied volatility in the economy. To do that, they consider variables that could, in a certain
way, foresee possible problems in the future like growth, inflation, current account,
unemployment level and other not-so-evident variables such as the flexibility of an
economy and its openness. However, these credit ratings do not measure, for example, risks
related to the lost of market value of these credit instruments and risks related to bilateral
conflicts between the issuer’s country and the institution’s country where the issue took
place. Another risk that is not incorporated in these ratings is convertibility risk, i.e., if the
payment of a certain obligation would be affected or not by any kind of control adopted by
the government in relation to the currency of denomination.40
Observe in the following figures the actions related to Brazilian long debt denominated in
foreign currency of the three credit rating agencies: Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch
IBCA, for the period of the Real Plan. It should be observed the lagged behavior
29 of these
agencies in comparison to the behavior of Brazil Risk, measured by Swaps (before
developed) and the Stripped Spread of the C-Bond.
Through these Figures, it is possible to see the conservative behavior of certain agencies
like Moody's. That one, 18 months after the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime in
Brazil, in January of 1999, still did not change Brazilian’s long-term debt denominated in
foreign currency, classified as B2. However, Fitch IBCA already changed its rating twice in
the same period, improving its rating from B, in January 1999, to BB+, nowadays.

































































































































































































































































































































                                                          
29 Credit rating agencies classify in a very similar way long run debts denominated in foreign currency of
countries. To transform these ratings into values that could be observed in a Figure, a scale from zero to ten
was created, tem being the worst possible classification. I.e., the values were arbitrary in such a way that
when there is an improvement in credit rating of the country, in the figure, it would be shown by a decline in
the relative values of this classification. In that way, there is going to be a positive correlation between
country risk and these ratings.41
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